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THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF
1970 AS APPLIED TO THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY:
THE MULTI-EMPLOYER WORKSITE PROBLEM
Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, for
the purpose of assuring "so far as possible, every working man and woman
in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions."' 2 Congress had found
prior state statutory and common law remedies3 inadequate to protect
employees from the problem of work-related deaths and injury.' The Act
I Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970)) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
2 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970).
In all states most employees injured in the course of their employment can collect
damages under workmen's compensation statutes. 1 A. LARSONS, LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 5.30 at 39 (1972). Under these statutes the employer is strictly liable for all
covered injuries and compensation for harm is often fixed by the legislation itself. W. PRos-
SER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRrs 531 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. Those
employees not covered by a workmen's compensation plan may rely on common law. At
common law an employer is required to provide a reasonably safe place, safe appliances,
necessary warnings of workplace dangers and reasonable work rules. The employer, however,
may defend against liability on grounds of the employee's contributory negligence or assump-
tion of risk. See Miller, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and the Law of Torts,
38 L. & CONTEMP. PRoa. 612 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Miller]. Furthermore, the employer
is not liable for the harm caused solely by the negligence of a fellow servant of the injured
employee. PROSSER, supra, at 528.
The degree to which the Act incorporates concepts from common law is unclear. Com-
ment, OSHA and Multiple Employer Liability: A Discussion of Anning-Johnson Co. v.
OSHRC, 62 VA. L. REv. 788 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Discussion of Anning-Johnson].
Although Congress did not intend to allow. employers the common law defenses, National
Realty & Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC), 489
F.2d 1257, 2165 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1973), language in the legislative history indicates Congress
felt that common law principles supported the rationale of the Act. H. R. REP. No. 91-1291,.
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
& HEALTH ACT OF 1970 at 851 (Comm. Print 1971).
One commentator has indicated that common law principles can be used to at least a
limited degree in enforcing the Act. Morey, The General Duty Clause of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 86 HARv. L. REV. 980, 1004-05 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Morey]. For example, as at common law the employer should not be liable when employees
deliberately create a hazard. Id. The courts have accepted this posiition in cases where the
employer has taken reasonable steps to reduce employee misconduct. See, f.T.O. Corp. v.
OSHRC, 540 F.2d 543 (1st Cir. 1976); Home Plumbing & Heating Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d
564 (5th Cir. 1976); Note, OSHA: Employer Liability for Employee Violations, 1977 DUKE L.
J. 614 (1977).
Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442 (1977). The legislative history of the Act
shows that Congress considered the problem of work-related injuries among the primary
issues facing the nation. See S. REP. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1970), reprinted
in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ACT OF 1970, at 142 (Comm.
Print 1971). Constant references were made in debates on the Act to the fact that nearly
14,500 persons were killed annually as a result of industrial accidents. Id. Also emphasized
was the 20 percent increase from 1958 to 1970 in the number of disabling injuries per million
man hours worked. Id.
Recent statistics indicate that the Act has been successful in reducing job-related acci-
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supplements the traditional approach adopted by the states of limiting
employer liability to the compensation of the injured employee.' Rather
than merely imposing additional liability for actual harm suffered, the Act
penalizes employers for maintaining unsafe working conditions.' The Act
applies to virtually all employers and employees engaged in business af-
fecting interstate commerce,7 and has been hailed as a new bill of rights
for labor.'
Congress placed the responsibility for enforcing the Act in the Secretary
of Labor as head of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA). The Secretary is empowered to issue regulations establishing
dents. According to a Bureau of Labor Statistics survey there has been a 17 percent decrease
in the incidence rate of recordableinjuries for 100 full-time workers, from 10.9 in 1972 to 9.1
in 1975. See JOB SAFETY & HEALTH (Jan. 1977) at 5. Furthermore, the Act appears to be
increasingly effective; the same survey showed a 16 percent decrease in work-related injuries
between 1974 and 1975. Id.
I Under workmen's compensation acts and common law an employer will be held liable
only if an injury actually occurs to an employee. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 525-530. For a
discussion on employer liability under workmen's compensation and common law, see note 3
supra. An employer may find that compensating employee injuries is cheaper than abating a
particular hazard and therefore allow a dangerous condition to exist. The Act eliminates this
option by requiring the employer to remove most hazardous conditions. See 1 EMPL. SAFETY
& HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 4,219 (1975).
See 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1970).
For the purposes of the Act, an "employer" is defined as "a person engaged in a
business affecting commerce who has employees, but does not include the United States or
any State or political subdivision of a State." 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1970). "Employee" is
defined as a person whose employer's business affects commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 652(6) (1970).
These definitions were chosen by Congress in part to bring the Act within the commerce
clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 3, which permits Congress to pass
statutes affecting interstate commerce. Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1260
(4th Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court has interpreted the commerce clause to encompass acts
which, if committed by a few individuals may not affect interstate commerce, but could affect
such trade if done by large numbers of individuals. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 192-93
(1968); Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942); United States v. Ohio, 354 F.2d 549, 555 (6th Cir. 1965),
rev 'd per curiam on other grounds, 385 U.S. 9 (1966). For example, one firm operating without
providing employees necessary safety equipment may not affect commerce among the states;
permitting one business to avoid the cost of safety equipment, however, could affect interstate
commerce by forcing competitors similarly to cut their cost. Brennan v. OSHRC (Gordon),
492 F.2d 1027, 1030 (2d Cir. 1974) (states and employers insisting on high degree of safety
should not be placed at economic disadvantage by failure of others to do so). The aggregate
action of such employers may affect interstate commerce. See Godwin v. OSHRC, 540 F.2d
1013 (9th Cir. 1976) (clearing of tract of land for purposes of growing grapes held business
affecting interstate commerce). Virtually any type of private economic activity can be held
subject to federal authority under the commerce clause. See B. SCHWARTz, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 100 (1972). Therefore, the Occupational Safety and Health Act should be upheld against
a constitutional attack based on the commerce clause. See Godwin v. OSHRC, 540 F.2d 1013
(9th Cir. 1976).
See SEN. SUB. COMM. ON LABOR, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON THE OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY & HEALTH ACT OF 1970, reprinted in LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
& HEALTH ACT OF 1970, at iii (Comm. Print 1971).
1 1 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) T 527 (1977); Gross, The Occupational Safety
& Health Act: Much Ado About Something, 3 LOYOLA-CHI. L.J. 247, 257 (1972) [hereinafter
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safety standards with which employers must comply.'" Citations are issued
by OSHA area directors on the basis of inspection reports filed by OSHA
compliance officers." A cited employer has the right to have a citation'2
cited as Gross]. The Secretary is empowered to issue safety and health standards. 29 U.S.C.
§ 655 (1970). Such regulations require the employer to provide certain safety precautions that
are reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe and healthful places of employment.
29 U.S.C. § 655 (1970). For examples of these standards, see note 24 infra.
,0 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1970).
1 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 4,326.2 (1976). Whether an administrative
search warrant is required before a compliance officer can inspect a workplace is currently
being decided by the Supreme Court. Barlow's Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho
1976), prob. juris, noted, sub nom., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 429 U.S. 1347 (1977), appeal
docketed, No. 76-1143 (Sp. Ct. Feb. 17, 1977).
12 Citations must "describe with particularity the nature of each violation" and the
OSHA regulations involved. 1 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 4121 (1977).
,1 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1970); 1 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 4515 (1974-75);
see, e.g., I.T.O. Corp. v. OSHRC, 540 F.2d 543 (1st Cir. 1976); United States Steel Corp. v.
OSHRC, 537 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1976); Olin Const. Co. v. OSHRC, 525 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1975).
Congress created the OSHRC as a compromise between desires of the executive branch
to have the rule-making, adjudication, and inspection powers of the Act in separate bodies,
and desires of organized labor to have total consolidation of these functions in one federal
agency. See Moran, An Oversight of Penalty Increases and Adjudicatory Functions Under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. 33 FED. BAR. J. 139 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Moran']. These competing interests resulted in Congress granting the OSHRC the adjudica-
tory powers and the Secretary of Labor the standard-creating authority. Id. at 139. The
Secretary, as nominal head of OSHA, was also given the duty to inspect worksites. Id.; see
text accompanying note 9 supra. Neither the Act nor the legislative history actually deline-
ates whether the Secretary or the OSHRC has the policy-making role. Moran,I supra at 140.
The issue of whether an employee must be exposed to a hazard or merely have access to
the danger illustrates the necessity of determining how policy questions are to be decided
under the Act. The OSHRC has held that to support a violation of the Act, the Secretary
must show that an employee was likely to have "access" to a hazard. Gilles & Cotting, Inc.
OSHD (CCH) 20,448, at 24,423 (OSHRC 1976); cf. Moran2 , The Developing Law of Occu-
pational Safety & Health, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 354, 357 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Moran 2]
(OSHRC's adoption of the "access" standard not conclusive of OSHRC position because
OSHRC failed to overrule prior decisions based on actual "exposure" test). "Access" exists
where, for example, an employer creates a hazard by using an unsecured scaffold, and em-
ployees of another employer might walk beneath the scaffold on the way to their workplace.
See Public Improvements, Inc., OSHD (CCH) T 21,326, at 25,611 (OSHRC 1976); Staley &
Lawrenz, Inc., OSHD (CCH) 21,153, at 25,448 (OSHRC 1976). Under the Secretary of
Labor's proposed regulation concerning employers at a multi-firm worksite, the Secretary
must find that employees are actually exposed to a hazard. 41 Fed. Reg. 17,639 (1976). The
OSHA area director will issue citations only upon proof of such exposure. See 1 EMPL. SAFETY
& HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 4360.1 (1976). Under the Secretary's test, for example, an employer
controlling an unsecured scaffold violates the Act only if employees do in fact walk beneath
the scaffold. See Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., OSHD (CCH) 19,158, at 22,897 (OSHRC 1974),
appeal dismissed, No. 73-1181 (7th Cir. May 31, 1975). Thus the Secretary has placed a
heavier burden on OSHA inspectors than the OSHRC feels appropriate.
The federal courts disagree on whether the Secretary of Labor or the OSHRC is vested
with the policy-making authority for determining when a violation of the Act has occurred.
Budd Co. v. OSHRC 513 F.2d 201, 205 n.12 (3d Cir. 1975); see Brennan v. OSHRC (Brent
Towing), 481 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1973). Compare Dale M. Madden Constr., Inc. v. Hodgson,
502 F.2d 278, 280 (9th Cir. 1974) (broad enforcement powers granted Secretary shows congres-
sional intent that he have policy-making role) with Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504
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reviewed by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
(OSHRC).11 Anyone adversely affected by a decision of the OSHRC may
F.2d 1255, 1262 (4th Cir. 1974) (OSHRC powers comparable to administrative agency). The
conflict centers upon whether the policy determinations of the OSHRC, the body empowered
to perform the final administrative adjudication, Brennan v. OSHRC (Fiegen, Inc.), 513 F.2d
713, 715-16 (8th Cir. 1975), or of the Secretary, whose setting of standards is within the policy-
making sphere, Synthetic Organic Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 506 F.2d 385, 390 (3rd
Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975), should be entitled to the deference that courts
normally accord administrative policy determination. Note, OSHA - on Multi-employer
Worksites, 87 HARv. L. REv. 793, 799 n.42 (1976). Because the Secretary and the OSHRC
differ on how the Act should be applied to multi-employer worksites, resolution of the ques-
tion of which body is vested with policy-making authority might be important. See Brennan
v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc. 504 F.2d 1255, 1257 (4th Cir. 1974).
The Ninth Circuit has held that the Secretary has the sole policy-making power. Dale
M. Madden Constr. Inc. v. Hodgson, 502 F.2d 278, 280 (9th Cir. 1974); cf. Langer Roofing &
Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 524 F.2d 1337, 1338 (7th Cir. 1975) (deference given
to OSHRC's interpretation of Secretary's regulation). The Hodgson court based its decision
on the broad enforcement powers Congress gave the Secretary of Labor as opposed to the
limited trier of fact role provided the OSHRC. 502 F.2d at 280. The Fourth Circuit, however,
has held that the OSHRC is vested with the policy-making authority and that federal courts
should defer only to the OSHRC's view. Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255,
1262 (4th Cir. 1974). In reaching this conclusion the Fourth Circuit emphasized some limited
language in the legislative history comparing the OSHRC to administrative agencies with
policy-making authority. Id. at 1262; see Moran,' supra at 140; Gross, supra note 9, at 260.
The court placed particular emphasis on comments by Senator Javits, floor sponsor of the
floor amendment creating the OSHRC, implying that the OSHRC would have the same
authority as the Federal Trade Commission. 504 F.2d at 1262.
Nothing in the legislative history of the Act, however, clearly shows that Congress consid-
ered the issue. Moran,' supra, at 140. Consequently, there is no legislative basis for the
courts to determine that either body has the policy-making authority. When there is a policy
disagreement between the Secretary and the OSHRC, the courts should make their own
decision on the merits without deferring to either body. See, e.g., Brennan v. Southern Const.
Serv., 492 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1974); Brennan v. OSHRC (Gerosa), 491 F.2d 1340 (2d Cir. 1974).
An issue comparable to the question of which body has policy-making authority is
whether the courts should defer to the OSHRC's or the Secretary's interpretation of OSHA
regulations. Whichever body is determined to have controlling authority in this area, courts
would be bound to defer to that body's reasonable construction of OSHA standards. See Budd
Co. v. OSHRC, 513 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1975); cf. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)
(Secretary of Interior's interpretation of executive order on disposition of public lands usually
must be deferred to by courts); Roy Bryant Cattle Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 418, 420
(5th Cir. 1972) (Department of Agriculture's interpretation of its own regulation is to be
accorded greatest deference). Compare Clarkson Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 531 F.2d 451, 457
(10th Cir. 1976) (Secretary's interpretation of OSHA regulation controlling if reasonable) with
Brennan v. OSHRC, 513 F.2d 713, 715-16 (8th Cir. 1975) (OSHRC's interpretation of OSHA
regulation controls if different from Secretary's interpretation). As with the question of
policy-making authority, there is no legislative basis for the courts to determine that either
the OSHRC or the Secretary of Labor has final authority in this area.
In Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442 (1977), an employer attacked the constitu-
tionality of Congress placing the adjudicatory role in the OSHRC. The employer argued that
the seventh amendment right to a jury trial barred Congress from assigning to an administra-
tive agency rather than to district courts the power to adjudicate violations of the Act. at
449. The Court held, however, that the seventh amendment pertains only to common law
rights and therefore is inapplicable to newly created statutory public rights. Id. at 455.
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obtain judicial review in a federal appellate court.4
Implementation of the Act has given rise to a number of problems, 5 one
of which is the application of the Act's requirements to multi-employer
worksites.16 The Act requires employers to provide a safe place of employ-
ment. It does not provide for any exceptions from this duty for firms at
multi-employer worksites.'7 At such a worksite, however, a hazard can be
created by one employer in areas controlled by another firm 8 and employ-
ees of a third company also may be endangered. Thus, application of the
Act to multi-firm projects raises the question to what extent an employer's
duty runs solely to his own employees, and to what degree does the Act
obligate an employer to protect other employees at the worksite. Resolu-
tion of these questions is essential for determining whom to cite and whom
to hold responsible for violations on a multi-employer worksite.
In handling citations from multi-firm worksites courts have focused on
how the Act delineates the obligations imposed upon employers to protect
employees. These duties are listed at section 5(a) of the Act.2" Section
" 29 U.S.C. § 660(a)(b) (1970). Review of OSHRC orders may be sought either in the
circuit court for the region where the violation occurred, where the employer has his principle
place of business, or in the District of Columbia Circuit. Id. Since the OSHRC has rejected
certain circuits' interpretations of the Act regarding multi-employer worksites, see, e.g.,
Anning-Johnson Co., OSHD (CCH) 20,690, at 24,779 (OSHRC 1976); Grossman Steel &
Aluminum Corp. OSHD (CCH) 20,691, at 24,791 (OSHRC 1976), the ability to choose
among different circuits will undoubtedly lead to forum shopping until a Supreme Court
determination is made. Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (state and federal courts
in same state reaching different decisions on same question of law encourages forum shopping
in state).
11 See Note, The Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970: Some Unresolved Issues and
Potential Problem, 41 GEO. WASH. L. Rzv. 304 (1972).
11 A multi-employer worksite is one in which two or more independent firms cooperate
in the completion of a common project. See White & Carney, OSHA Comes of Age: The Law
of Work Place Environment, 28 Bus. LAW. 1309, 1315-16 (1973). Such worksites are common
in the construction industry, where normally a number of subcontractors work simultaneously
on a structure. Id.
1" There is no reference to multi-employer worksites in the'Act or its legislative history.
See Anning-Johnson Co. v. OSHRC, 516 F.2d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 1975). Congress apparently
did not foresee the issues raised in applying the act to circumstances like construction sites.
See Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1974). Thus, courts attempting
to discern congressional intent must rely on the structure of the Act and underlying congres-
sional policy. Nutting, The Reference of Legislative Intention Established by Extrinsic
Evidence, 20 B.U.L. Rav. 601 (1940).
11 An employer "controls" a hazard if he has the contractual authority to order another
firm to abate the hazard or is obligated to correct dangerous conditions within the area
containing the hazard. See Brennan v. OSHRC (Underhill), 513 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1975);
Beatty Equip. Leasing Inc., OSHD (CCH) 20,694, at 24,801 (OSHRC 1976); Otis Elevator
Co., OSHD (CCH) T 20,693, at 24,796 (OSHRC 1976).
" 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1970). Section 5(a) of the Act states that each employer:
(1) shall furnish to each of his employees . . .a place of employment . . .
free from recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause death or serious
physical harm to his employees.
(2) shall comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated
under this chapter.
1978]
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5(a) (1),21 known as the general duty clause,22 requires that every employer
provide a work place free from recognized hazards likely to cause death
29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1970).
Subsection (1) applies only if a regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Labor under § 6
of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1970), does not cover the particular danger involved. Sun
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., OSHD (CCH) 16,725, at 21,474 (OSHRC 1973). Violations
of subsection (2) are classified as either serious or non-serious. 1 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH
GUIDE (CCH) 4099 (1976). Congress defined serious violations as those in which there is a
"substantial probability that death or serious physical harm will result .... " 29 U.S.C. §
666 () (1970). This language is essentially that of the general duty clause. See Anning-
Johnson Co. v. OSHRC, 516 F.2d 1081, 1088-89 (7th Cir. 1975). A non-serious violation is one
not likely to cause serious harm. Id. In comparing the two subsections, the courts have
emphasized that the general duty clause limits the employer's duty to "his employees." Id.
The specific duty clause however does not state that the duty imposed runs to a particular
class of individuals. Id.
1 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1970).
1, Id. at § 654(a)(1).
2 Morey, supra note 3, at 989. The legislative history of the Act shows that Congress
based the general duty clause on the common law duty that a person refrain from conduct
that is likely to cause harm to others. H.R. REP. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 21 (1970),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ACT OF 1970 at 851
(Comm. Print 1971). A congressional report on the Act emphasized that employers are bound
by common law not to harm employees during the course of their employment. Id. This
common law origin may be very important when dealing with multi-employer worksites
because the employer's general duty has been held to run only to his own employees. See
Brennan v. OSHRC (Underhill), 513 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1975). If, however, common law
principles apply to general duty clause violations, an employer creating a hazard is culpable
regardless of whose employees are endangered. For a discussion of employer's common law
obligation to provide a safe workplace, see note 3 supra.
1 The term "recognized hazard" as used in the Act is defined in terms of both knowledge
of the entire industry and individual employer's knowledge. 1 EMPL. SAFYrv & HEALTH GUIDE
(CCH) 11005 (1977). If a condition is acknowledged by an industry as being dangerous, the
hazard is considered recognized whether or not any particular employer knew of the danger.
National Cleaning Contractor, Inc., OSHD (CCH) 19,104, at 22,834 (OSHRC 1974), aff'g
OSHD (CCH) 1 17,672, at 22,073 (ALJ 1974). Constructive knowledge is imputed to each
employer within the industry. See R.J.H. Contractors, Inc. OSHD (CCH) 15,422, at 20,657
(AIU 1973). A hazard is recognized by the industry if the danger connected with a circum-
stance is of common knowledge to safety experts familiar with the industry in question.
National Realty & Constr. Co. 489 F.2d 1257, 1265 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see Miller, supra
note 3, at 625. If the employer has actual knowledge of the danger, however, industry recogni-
tion is not required. Brennan v. OSHRC (Vy Lactos Laboratories), 494 F.2d 460 (8th Cir.
1974).
The legislative history supports application of constructive knowledge. The original ver-
sion of the Act passed by the Senate contained the language "recognized hazard." LEoIsLATIvE
HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ACr OF 1970, 1007 (Comm. Print 1971). The
House version, however, adopted the words "readily apparent." Id. The proponents of the
Senate's language felt that "recognized hazard," unlike "readily apparent hazard," required
an objective test and did not depend on any particular employer's knowledge. Id. Thus, the
Senate form would impose liability on ill-informed and careless employers. Id. The adoption
of the Senate's language in the final version of the Act supports imputing constructive knowl-
edge of industry-recognized hazard to employers. Vy Lactos Laboratories, Inc., OSHD (CCH)
15,050, at 20,101 (OSHRC 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Brennan v. OSHRC,
494 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1974).
The imputing of constructive knowledge to employers should result in increased worker
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or serious harm. Section 5(a)(2) of the Act requires each firm to provide a
work environment that complies with safety standards promulgated by the
Secretary of Labor. 4 For purposes of determining whether an employer is
providing a safe workplace, "workplace" has been defined by the OSHRC
as including all areas to which his employees have access. 5
The courts also have placed emphasis on how breaches of the em-
ployer's duties are categorized under the Act. 6 Violations are classified as
being serious or non-serious.Y Serious violations occur only if there is sub-
awareness of hazards at multi-employer worksites. If the recognized construction industry
hazards are assumed known by all employers at a worksite, constructive knowledge of all
recognized hazards of other crafts at the project will be imputed to each employer. To avoid
liability each employer will have to train his employees in the dangers common to other
specialties. See Anning-Johnson Co. v. OSHRC, 516 F.2d 1081 (similar reasoning concerning
non-serious violations of the Act). Support for this result can be found in the Act's emphasis
on employee education. See 29 U.S.C. § 670(c) (1970). The requirement that the workplace
be free from recognized hazards, however, does not impose strict liability on the employer.
National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Unpreventable
hazards are not considered recognized under this subsection. Id. at 1265-66. Courts should
evaluate the feasibility and utility of protective measures in determining whether a hazard
is preventable. See Satter, Shedding Some Light on the Burden of Proof in Demonstrating a
Violation of the General Duty Clause of OSHA: National Realty, 15 B. C. IND. & COM. L.
REv. 1075 (1974). Because an employer can always protect his employees at a multi-firm
project by pulling them from the worksite, feasible protection must not encompass complete
work stoppage. Id.
2 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (1970). See, e.g., OSHA standards, Walking-Working Surfaces,
General Requirements, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.22 (1976); Means of Egress, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.37
(1976); Personal Protective Equipment, Eye & Face Protection, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.133 (1976).
An example of a standard applicable to the typical multi-employer construction site is 29
C.F.R. § 1910.23 (1976), which requires in part that "every stairway floor opening shall be
guarded by a standard railing. . . ." Id. at § 1910.23(a)(1).
An employer creates a hazard by failing to comply with safety standards. See Moran,
Occupational Safety & Health Standards as Federal Law, 15 Wm. & MARY L. Ray. 777 (1974).
Anyone adversely affected by the creation of a particular standard may obtain judicial review
in a federal court of appeals. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1970). A court of appeals should uphold the
standard if the requirement is reasonably necessary or appropriate to the providing of a safe
workplace. Synthetic Organic Chemical Mfr. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1133 (3rd Cir. 1974);
National Roofing Constr. Ass'n v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 1294 (7th Cir. 1974). Economic as well
as safety considerations should be evaluated in determining the validity of a standard. AFL-
CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1975). Compliance with a specific standard is consid-
ered compliance with the general duty clause to the extent the latter is covered by the
standard. 1 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 1 1010 (1977). This result accords with the
position of some commentators that the general duty clause is no more than a specific safety
standard promulgated by Congress. Gross, supra note 3, at 270.
25 See Gilles & Cotting, Inc., OSHD (CCH) % 20,448, at 24,423 (OSHRC 1976). An
employer breaches his duty imposed by § 5(a) when one of his employees has access to a "zone
of danger." Id.; see Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., v. OSHRC, 535 F.2d 371 (7th Cir. 1976); REA
Express, Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1974); Underhill Constr. Corp., OSHD (CCH)
20,918, at 25,120 (OSHRC 1976). One commentator has indicated that whether the commis-
sion applies an "exposure" or "access" test is unclear. Moran,2 supra, note 13, at 357. For a
discussion of the conflicting results occurring under these tests, see note 65 infra.
" See, Discussion of Anning-Johnson, supra note 3, at 799.
2 See 1 EMPL. SAFETY & HAmTH GUIDE (CCH) 17 4135-37 (1977).
1978]
180 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
stantial probability that death or serious injury will result;2 all other viola-
tions are non-serious.29 General duty clause violations are always denoted
as serious, 0 while breaches of the Secretary's safety standards promul-
gated under the Act may fall into either category. 3 Non-serious violations,
however, occur only from non-compliance with specific safety regulations."
Violations arising at multi-employer worksites occur in three distinct
factual contexts. The first and least complex situation involves an em-
ployer at a multi-firm project who creates or controls a hazard and whose
own workmen have access to the danger. The Secretary has taken the
position that citations should be issued to firms whose workers are endan-
gered by conditions their employer created or could have corrected.3 3 This
policy is in accord with the stated purpose of the Act." No basis exists for
excusing a firm from liability arising in a multi-employer worksite under
circumstances substantially similar to a single-employer situation 5. 3 The
OSHRC3' and the federal courts37 have accepted this view.
29 U.S.C. § 666 (1970).
See, id.
3 See, Discussion of Anning-Johnson, supra note 3, at 790; 1 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH
GUIDE (CCH) 1003 (1977).
3, See, 1 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 9 4098-99 (1977).
1 See, Discussion of Anning-Johnson, supra note 3, at 790, 1 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH
GUIDE (CCH) 1003 (1977). The Act requires the Secretary to make a specific designation
that a violation is "non-serious" if the violation does not involve a likelihood of serious harm.
1 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) T 4099 (1976). If such a designation is not made, the
violation will be treated as serious. Id.
The penalty assessed for a violation whether serious or non-serious may be up to $1.000.
29 U.S.C. § 666 (1970). As a matter of practice, however, the penalty for a non-serious
violation is generally between $50 and $300. 1 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 4161
(1977). The penalty imposed for a serious violation is generally between $300 and $1000. Id.
Section 17(J) of the Act requires the OSHRC in setting penalties to consider the possible
degree of employee injury, as well as the employer's good faith, prior history, and firm size
in determining the fine for a violation. 29 U.S.C. § 666 (i) (1970).
1 See 1 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 4360.1, at 1589 (1977). At a worksite in
which there is only one employer, there are four elements which the Secretary must prove in
order to show an employer has violated the Act. Moran,' supra note 13, at 355; see National
Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973). There must exist a recog-
nized hazard likely to cause serious harm or non-compliance with a safety standard, see 29
U.S.C. § 654(a) (1970); an employee must be endangered from such non-compliance or
hazard, see City Wide Tuck. Serv. Co., OSHD (CCH) 15,769, at 21,050 (OSHRC 1973);
the employer must have actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard or non-compliance;
Brennan v. OSHRC (Raymond Hendrix), 511 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1975); and there must be
effective and feasible measures which the employer could have taken to avoid endangering
the employee. See General Elec. Co. v. OSHRC, 540 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1976); National Realty
& Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
11 See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1970).
31 See Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1975); Elmer R.
Vath, OSHD (CCH) $ 18,161, at 22,335 (OSHRC 1974), aff'g 15,391, at 20,571 (A.J 1972);
Bob McCaslin Steel Erection Co., OSHD (CCH) 17,314, at 21,865 (AJ 1974).
See Lipsky & Rosenthal, Inc., OSHD (CCH) 15,256, at 20,333 (OSHRC 1972).
See Bechtel Power Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 548 F.2d 248 (8th Cir. 1977); Brennan
v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1975).
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A second set of circumstances resulting in the issuance of citations
arises where the only workers endangered by a hazard created or controlled
by a particular employer are workers of other firms. The OSHRC's original
position was that an employer who creates a hazard does not violate the
Act if none of his employees are endangered .3 The rationale supporting
this position is that only the employer of the endangered workers has the
authority to remove them from an unsafe work condition. 39 Two circuit
courts have faced the conflict between this reasoning and the preventive
purposes of the Act.
In Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc.,"o the Fourth Circuit ruled that
OSHA area directors could cite only those employers whose own employees
were imperiled.4 ' The Court based its opinion on an OSHA regulation
issued by the Secretary of Labor that provided "in the event a standard
protects on its face a class of persons larger than employees, the standard
shall be applicable only to employees and their place of employment."4
The court held that the regulation conditioned each employer's liability on
his workers being endangered and not on his responsibility for the existence
of the hazard.1
3
The court's interpretation is consistent with a definitional analysis of
the Act. The regulation conditions liability on "employee" endangerment.
"Employee" is defined under the Act in terms of a contractual relationship
with a particular employer. Consequently, the term "employee" as de-
fined in the Act necessitates interpreting the regulation to restrict the
issuing of citations to the particular employer of an endangered worker.46
11 Hawkins Constr. Co., OSHD (CCH) 17,851, at 22,196 (OSHRC 1974); see Brennan
v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1260 (4th Cir. 1974); City Wide Tuck. Serv. Co.,
OSHD (CCH) 17,851, at 22,196 (OSHRC 1973).
3' OSHA - On Multi-employer Worksites, supra note 13, at 797 (1976); see Humphreys
& Harding, Inc., OSHD (CCH) 17,784, at 22,141 (OSHRC 1974). The position that an
employer violates the Act only when his employees are endangered is supported by the
emphasis of the Act on the employment relationship. For a discussion of the contractual
relationship between an employer and his employees, see note 134 infra. The language of the
general duty clause that an employer owes "his employees" a safe workplace further supports
this position. See Moran,2 supra note 13, at 356; Morey, supra note 3, at 597. Contra, Bren-
nan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1260 (4th Cir. 1974), (general definition of "em-
ployee" uninformative in determining multi-employer liability because definition is framed
in terms of Congress's power over interstate commerce).
40 504 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1974).
11 Id. at 1262.
42 29 C.F.R. § 1910.5(d) (1970). See OSHA - On Multi-employer Worksites, supra note
13, at 797 n.39.
- 504 F.2d at 1260. The Secretary maintained that existing OSHA regulations permitted
the citing of employers who controlled hazards to which employees of any firm at the worksite
were exposed. For a discussion whether a court should defer to the OSHRC's or the Secre-
tary's interpretation of an OSHA regulation, see note 13 supra.
4" 29 C.F.R. § 1910.5(d) (1970).
See Gilles & Cotting, Inc., OSHD (CCH) 16,763, at 21,512 (OSHRC 1973), aff'd, 504
F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1974).
11 But see Gilles & Cotting, Inc., OSHD (CCH) 16,763, at 21,512 (OSHRC 1973), aff'd,
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Since the Fourth Circuit based its opinion solely on the breadth of the
Secretary's regulation47 and because OSHA is bound by the court's inter-
pretation of such regulations,48 the court did not reach the issue of whether
a broader regulation could be issued to allow OSHA to cite firms that have
created or controlled a hazard but whose own workers are not endangered.49
The Second Circuit in Brennan v. OSHRC (Underhill)," however, in-
terpreted the regulation to cover creating and controlling employers re-
gardless of whose employees are endangered. Thus the Second Circuit
reached a broader question concerning the scope of the Act.5' In Underhill,
a construction company was cited by OSHA for non-serious violations
under circumstances in which none of the firm's workers had access to the
hazard.2 The OSHRC vacated the citation on the ground that a firm
violates the Act only when the firm's own employees have access to a
dangerous condition. 53 In finding the OSHRC position unreasonable the
Second Circuit ruled that to support a violation of section 5(a)(2) of the
Act, the Secretary must show only that the areas of the hazard controlled
and maintained by the cited firm were accessible to any employee at the
worksite .51
In upholding the citation the Second Circuit primarily relied on the
stated purpose of the Act "to provide as far as possible safe working condi-
tions. ' 5 The court found support for its position in language of the Act
limiting the employer's responsibility under the general duty clause, which
requires the employer to provide a safe workplace for "his employees", and
a corresponding absence of such limiting language under the specific duty
clause, which requires only that an employer "comply" with safety stan-
dards. 8 Since the employer's specific duty is not limited to his employees
the court reasoned that an employer's obligation under the specific duty
clause is "over and above" that required by the general duty clause.57
504 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1974) (definition of "employee" in Act limits employer's duty to own
employees).
" Gilles & Cotting, 504 F.2d at 1260.
Id.; see United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372, 374-76 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 416 U.S.
983 (1974); United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1969).
11 504 F.2d at 1260. The Fourth Circuit did not determine whether the Secretary has
auhtority to cite employers in the absence of a limiting regulation. Id. This limitation on the
ruling is important since the Secretary has proposed broader regulations to replace the one
at issue in Gilles & Cotting. See 41 Fed. Reg. 17,639 (1976).
513 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1037.
52 Id. at 1034.
Underhill Constr. Corp., OSHD (CCH) 19,276, at 23,054 (OSHRC), rev'd sub nom.,
Brennan v. OSHRC, 513 F.2d 1032 (2nd Cir. 1975).
513 F.2d 1038; Comment, Access Coupled with Control: New Standard for Liability
Under OSHA's Specific Duty Clause, 37 U. Prrr. L. REv. 416, 420 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as New Standard].
11 513 F.2d at 1038; see OSHA-On Multi-employer Worksites, supra note 13, at 797.
513 F.2d at 1038.
7 Id., see Morey, supra note 3, at 989; New Standard, supra note 54, at 420.
The Second Circuit's opinions does not disclose whether the ruling applies to general
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Inasmuch as the firm controlling the area where the hazard exists is in the
best position to abate the hazard,-" and the legislative history indicates
that preventability is "the keystone of the Act," 9 the Second Circuit's
ruling is a reasonable interpretation of the Act.0
duty clause violations. The court held that "to prove a violation, of OSHA the Secretary of
Labor need only show that a hazard has been committed and that the area of the hazard
[controlled by the cited employer] was accessible to any employee or any firm engaged in
the common undertaking." 513 F.2d at 1038. The words "violation of OSHA" would usually
include breaches of both the general and specific duty clauses. See Gross, supra note 9, at
252. The court's own reasoning, however, limits the application of the holding to only specific
duty yiolations.
The court reasoned that since the general duty clause requires an employer to provide
"his employees" a safe work environment, and the specific duty clause requiring compliance
with specific standards does not contain language limiting the employers duty to "his em-
ployee", the specific duty must be broader than the general duty. 513 F.2d at 1037. This
reasoning limits citations for breaching the general duty clause to those cases where a cited
employer's own employees are exposed to a recognized hazard likely to cause serious injury.
If the Underhill holding is limited to specific duty violations, the ruling is unreasonable.
Congress drafted the general duty clause to cover those hazards in which no specific standard
was enacted and the possible injury severe. See National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC,
489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., OSHD (CCH) 16,725,
at 21,474 (OSHRC 1973). Although the specific duty clause lacks the "his employee" lan-
guage of the general duty clause, nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress
intended this language to be a distinguishing factor concerning the coverage of the clauses.
See New Standard, supra note 54, at 422. The legislative history does show, however, Con-
gress's concern with the number of work-related deaths. See S. REP. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong.,
2nd Sess. 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177-78. If the scope of the
employer's duty under the specific duty clause is "over and above" the obligation established
by the general duty clause, Brennan v. OSHRC (Underhill), 513 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir.
1975), the Secretary's enforcement power in cases involving highly serious violations of the
general duty clause is more limited than his enforcement power in circumstances involving
non-serious violations likely to cause minimal injury. For a comparison between violations of
the specific duty clause and breaches of the general duty clause, see note 19 supra. Thus, the
implication of the Underhill ruling that the employer's obligation under the specific duty
clause is greater than under the general duty clause, although supported by the structure of
the Act, is contrary to legislative intent.
Anning-Johnson Co. v. OSHRC, 516 F.2d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 1975).
' 513 F.2d 1039; see National Realty & Constr. Corp. v OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266-67
(D.C. Cir. 1973); cf. Frohlick Crane Serv. Inc. v. OSHRC, 521 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1975)
("employer" defined broadly so as to maximize employee protection).
W OSHA - On Multi-employer Worksites supra note 13, at 797. At common law a
subcontractor at a multi-firm worksite was liable for injuries to other employers' workers if
the subcontractor controlled the hazard and knew that the injured employee was likely to
have access to the danger. See Perkins v. Henry J. Kaiser Constr. Co., 236 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.
W. Va. 1964) aff'd, 339 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1964); Richards v. Watson Flagg Eng'r. Co., 9 N.J.
Misc. 955, 156 A. 113 (1930), afl'd, 109 N.J.L. 128, 160 A. 500 (1931); Scalise v. F. M. Venzie
& Co., 301 Pa. 315, 152 A. 90 (1930); cf. Arthur v. Standard Eng'r Co., 193 F.2d 903 (D.C.
Cir. 1951) (subcontractor owes duty to another subcontractor's employees only if injury occurs
during activity of mutual benefit to both firms). Thus, to the extent the purpose of the Act
was to allow OSHA to enforce common law duties before injuries occur, the Second Circuit's
opinion fosters the intent of the legislature. For a discussion on Congress' intent concerning
incorporation of common law principles, see note 3 supra. The Underhill ruling does, however,
appear to be broader than the underlying common law concept in that the court does not
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In the cases of Anning-Johnson Co.,6 1 and Grossman Steel & Aluminum
Corp.,2 the OSHRC adopted the Second Circuit's holding in Underhill.3
The OSHRC, however, indicated that an employer who creates a hazard
to which his or another firm's employees have access may be cited for
violations of either the general or specific duty clauses. 4 Thus, the OSHRC
expanded the Underhill ruling to include breaches of the employer's obli-
gation to provide a workplace free of recognized dangers not covered by
safety standards but likely to cause serious injury."5 The legislative history
require that the employer realize that the hazard is accessible to other firm's workers. See
513 F.2d at 1038.
"OSHD (CCH) 20,690, at 24,779 (OSHRC 1976).
OSHD (CCH) 20,691, at 24,788 (OSHRC 1976).
OSHD (CCH) 1 20,690, at 24,779 (OSHRC 1976); OSHD (CCH) 20,691, at 24,790
(OSHRC 1976); see Beatty Equip. Leasing, Inc., OSHD (CCH) T 20,694, at 24,801-02
(OSHRC 1976).
" In Anning-Johnson If, the OSHRC held that "exposure" of one's employees to a haz-
ardous condition is an element that gives rise to an employer's duty under § 5(a) of the Act.
OSHD (CCH) 20,690, at 24,783. On the basis of Gilles & Cotting, Inc., OSHD (CCH)
20,448, at 24,423 (OSHRC 1976), the OSHRC must have been using the term "exposure" to
mean "have access to." See note 65 infra. Section 5(a) includes both the general and specific
duty clauses. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1970). Therefore the Anning-Johnson II opinion applies to
both general and specific duty clause violations. Furthermore, in Grossman Steel the OSHRC
uses the word "hazards" without making any distinction between recognized hazards covered
by the general duty clause or dangers arising from non-compliance with standards covered
by the specific duty clause. See OSHD (CCH) 20,691, at 24,791. Thus the OSHRC has not
followed the Second Circuit's emphasis on the general duty clause language that an employer
owes "his employees" a safe work environment. See id.
Also raised in Underhill was the i§sue whether a subcontractor may contract away his
duties under the Act. The Second Circuit stated that an employer can be liable only when
he is responsible for maintenance of the area where the hazard exists. 513 F.2d at 1033. The
OSHRC has held, however, that an employer's duties under the Act are non-delegable. See
R. H. Bishop Co., OSHD (CCH) 17,930, at 22,224 (OSHRC 1974); Comment, OSHA:
Developing Outlines of Liability in Multi-employer Situations, 62 GEO. L. J. 1483, 1496 n.74
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Developing Outlines]. The OSHRC's view is supported by the
common law rule that the employer's obligation to provide a safe place to work is non-
delegable. See Phillips Oil Co. v. Linn, 194 F.2d 903, 905 (4th Cir. 1952); J. Weingarten, Inc.
v. Moore, 441 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Cir. App. 1969); Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell, 70
S.W.2d 397, 401 (Tex. 1934).
Contractual assignment of the obligations imposed by the Act would have some benefi-
cial effects. Most important of these is that as a result of negotiations concerning contractual
redistribution of safety responsibilities, employers would consider safety problems at the start
of the multi-firm project. Developing Outlines, supra at 1497. The use of such clauses, how-
ever, would decrease the employer's incentive to provide a safe work environment during the
actual construction to the extent he is not obligated to correct dangerous conditions. See id.
The Secretary of Labor failed to follow the thrust of the Underhill ruling, and proposed
guidelines that require citing an employer who creates or controls a recognized hazard likely
to cause serious injury to which any employee is exposed. See 41 Fed. Reg. 17,639 (1976).
There is a distinction, however, between the Secretary's and OSHRC's positions. Under the
Secretary's position a citation may be issued only upon proof of actual employee exposure to
a hazard, id., while under the OSHRC's Gilles & Cotting ruling, OSHD (CCH) 20,448 at
24,423 (OSHRC 1976), all that is required is that employees probably have access to the
danger. See Moran,2 supra note 13, at 357. For further discussion on the distinction between
"access" and "exposure" see note 13 supra.
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provides no evidence that Congress intended the general duty clause to
impose a lesser obligation than the specific duty clause. It does display,
however, Congress's concern for preventing serious injuries." Since preven-
tion is essential when dealing with hazards which could possibly cause
death, the OSHRC position is more in accord with congressional intent
than is the Second Circuit's.7
The purposes of the Act are furthered more by the OSHRC's rule than by the Secretary's
regulation. According to the Secretary's position an employee must actually be in a place
where he could be injured. See New Standard, supra note 54, at 427. Often the result is that
before exposure can be shown an injury has occurred. Id. The OSHRC rule, however, lessens
the Secretary's burden by requiring him to show only that an employee was likely to have
access to an area where he might be injured. Id. Thus more accidents would be avoided under
the OSHRC rules. Id. Since the purpose of the Act was to prevent injury, the "likelihood of
access" standard is more in accord with the legislative history. See Brennan v. OSHRC
(Gerosa), 491 F.2d 1340 (2d Cir. 1974) (regulations should be construed broadly to effectuate
congressional objective of preventing accidents); H.R. REP. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess.
24 (1970) reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH Aar OF
1970, at 853 (Comm. Print 1971).
14 See H.R. REP. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 24 (1970). reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ACT OF 1970 at 853 (Comm. Print 1971).
" See Frohlick Crane Serv., Inc. v. OSHRC, 521 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1975) (cited em-
ployer need not have contractual relationship with endangered employee to warrant citation
for serious violation of standards).
In Anning-Johnson II the OSHRC held that a cited employer has the burden of showing
that he did not control the area of the hazard because the employer has greater access to facts
than the Secretary. Anning-Johnson Co., OSHD (CCH) 1 20,690, at 24,783 n.14 (OSHRC
1976). The OSHRC supported placing the burden on the employer by finding statutory
authorization for "effective enforcement programs" in § 2(b) of the Act. Id. at 24,783; see 29
U.S.C. § 651(b)(10) (1970). The OSHRC's allocation of the burden of proof allows the Secre-
tary to cite firms at a multi-employer worksite without first determining that the firm had
control over the hazard in question. See Anning-Johnson Co., OSHD (CCH) 20,690, at
24,787 (OSHRC 1976) (Moran, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Commissioner Moran dissented from the portion of the Anning-Johnson II opinion con-
cerning allocation of the burden of proof and maintained that this allocation of the burden
of proof deprived employers of their constitutional presumption of innocence and would
unjustly cost firms thousands of dollars in defense fees. Id. Commissioner Moran's constitu-
tional objection is supported by the enforcement procedure of the Act. Citations are issued
by the Secretary in his role as a prosecutor. See 29 U.S.C. § 663 (1970). The Secretary must
prove the validity of the citation to the OSHRC, which is an adjudicatory body. See 1 EMPL.
SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 4659 (1974). Furthermore, the Act calls for fines and the
use of criminal sanctions for obstructing the enforcing process. 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1970). There-
fore, the OSHRC's hearings should be treated as quasi-criminal and the presumption of
innocence should be accorded to the defendant. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d
990, 994-95 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 430 U.S. 442 (1976); Comment, The Multi-employer Work-
site Problem and the Review Commission's Response, 57 B.U.L. REv. 409 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Review Commission's Response].
It is a well established principle of common law that a person is presumed to be innocent
of a crime until proven guilty. See, e.g., United States v. Fleischman 339 U.S. 349 (1950);
Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1924). This presumption has been attached in
circumstances involving a violation of a statute punishable only by fine. See, e.g., Southern
Pac. Co. v. Schuyler, 227 U.S. 601 (1913). The presumption of innocence relates to every fact
that must be established against the accused to prove his culpability. See Kirby v. United
States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899). Therefore, if the Secretary cites a firm on the basis that the
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A third situation at multi-firm worksites has caused the most contro-
versy. " The controversy concerns whether an employer should be cited for
a violation because his employees had access to a worksite hazard which
the employer neither created nor controlled.69 The OSHRC faced this issue
in R. H. Bishop Co.,7° a case involving a non-serious violation of a safety
standard.7 In finding the cited firm in breach of the specific duty clause,
the OSHRC held that an employer violates the Act whenever one of his
employees is exposed to an area in which safety standards have not been
observed.7"
Under the R. H. Bishop Co. ruling, an employer cannot escape liability
on the grounds that others created the hazardous condition, were responsi-
ble for its existence or had control of the areas encompassing the danger.3
The OSHRC based its opinion primarily on the language of the specific
duty clause requiring that an employer comply with safety standards. 4
The OSHRC reasoned that since the Act did not exempt non-controlling
employees from the duty to comply with standards not likely to cause
serious injury, 5 all employers must insure that the areas to which their
employees have access comply with safety regulations.7
The Seventh Circuit in Anning-Johnson Co. v. OSHRC (Anning-
Johnson I)7" refused to adopt the OSHRC's interpretation of the Act. The
employer controlled a hazard, the Secretary should have the burden of proving that such
control existed. See Anning-Johnson Co., OSHD (CCH) 20,960, at 24,787 (Moran, Comm'r,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The Supreme Court's determination in Atlas Roofing v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442 (1977),
holding that a jury trial for violations of the Act was not required by the seventh amendment,
is limited to that issue and therefore not determinative of the presumption of innocence
question. See id. at 449. The Supreme Court relied heavily on the language of the seventh
amendment requiring jury trials for "suits at common law," holding OSHRC actions not suits
at common law. Id. at 449-50. There is no such limiting factor for the presumption of inno-
cence as the presumption is incorporated into the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
See Note, Affirmative Defense and Due Process: The Constitutionality of Placing the Burden
of Persuasion on a Criminal Defendant, 61 GEo. L. J. 871 (1976).
"8 Compare OSHA - On Multi-employer Worksites, supra note 13, at 798, with Discus-
sion of Anning-Johnson, supra note 3, at 791.
"' See, e.g., Alcap Elec. Corp., OSHD (CCH) 19,640, at 23,444 (OSHRC 1975); Robert
E. Lee Plumbers, OSHD (CCH) 19,574, at 23,402 (OSHRC 1975); Savannah Iron & Fence
Corp. OSHD (CCH) 18,233, at 22,383 (OSHRC 1974). The original position taken by the
Secretary was that an employer violates the Act when his employees are endangered, regard-
less whether the cited employer controlled the hazard. See OSHA - On Multi-employer
Worksites, supra note 13, at 798; 1 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) T 4380.1 (1974).
7. OSHD (CCH) 17,930, at 22,224 (OSHRC 1974).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 22,225.
73 Id.
74 Id.
11 See OSHA - On Multi-employer Worksites, supra note 13, at 798 n.41.
7' OSHD (CCH) 17,930, at 22,225 (OSHRC 1974).
" 516 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1975). The citations involved in Anning-Johnson were for non-
serious violations at the construction site of a building. Id. at 1082. The petitioners in the
case, Anning-Johnson and Workinger Electric, were sub-contractors whose employees were
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court held that a non-controlling employer does not violate the Act when
his workers have access to a danger unless the hazard is likely to cause
serious harm."8 In reaching its conclusion the court developed a two part
structural argument based on distinctions between the specific duty
clause, which encompasses serious and non-serious dangers, and the gen-
eral duty clause, which is limited to serious hazards.' .The court first noted
that the general duty clause is defined in terms of furnishing a safe place
of employment, but that the specific duty clause is defined in terms of
compliance with safety standards." The court reasoned from this differ-
ence that the employer's general duty is to provide a workplace free of
recognized hazards likely to cause serious injury, and his specific duty is
to maintain reasonable compliance with safety regulations in the area
controlled by his firm.8 ' The court concluded that the employer's general
duty extends to the whole worksite, but his specific duty extends only to
the areas in which his firm has the contractual authority to correct condi-
tions.
Although the first part of the court's analysis discusses the distinction
between the duty clauses, the second part is based on the relationship
between serious and non-serious violations of the Act. This second part of
the decision expands the employer's duty to prevent serious noncompli-
ance with standards to those areas outside the employer's area of control.
The court emphasized that serious violations of specific safety standards
and all violations of the general duty clause occur when there is possible
serious injury to an employee. 2 The court maintained that since a general
duty violation does not require the employer to control a hazard at issue,
neither should a serious violation of a safety standard." The Seventh Cir-
cuit completed its analysis by reasoning that since a non-serious violation
is defined as one not likely to cause serious injury, treating such a breach
in the same manner as violations of the general duty clause would create
a broader duty than required by the Act. 4 The court determined that such
a non-statutory duty would lead to results not intended by Congress and
inappropriate without specific congressional authorization., The Seventh
exposed to hazards created or controlled by the general contractor at the project, Wright
Construction. Id. Foremen of both subcontractors were aware of the hazardous conditions,
but allowed their men to remain at the worksite. Id. at 1083. The subcontractors took no steps
to abate the hazard although they were not prohibited from doing so by their contract with
Wright or the carpenters' union. Id.
,' 516 F.2d at 1086.
" See Review Commission's Response, supra note 67, at 412; OSHA - On Multi-
employer Worksites, supra note 13, at 795.
' 516 F.2d at 1086, quoting 29 U.S.C. § 654 (a)(1) (1970).
' 516 F.2d at 1086-87, citing 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (1970).
' 516 F.2d at 1086.
'8 Id.
" Id.
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that employers may find themselves required to remove
employees from worksites in order to avoid non-serious violations. Id. at 1090-91. The court
maintained that Congress did not intend such a result when the possible injury to employees
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Circuit therefore held that when a situation involves a serious violation of
the Act at a multi-firm worksite the OSHA area director must cite employ-
ers whose employees have access because an employer is responsible to his
employees for the existence of such hazards wherever they occur at the
project." If the alleged violation would be classified as non-serious, how-
ever, the hazard must be in the area controlled by a particular employer
before the firm can be cited.87
The Seventh Circuit's reasoning is persuasive. The employer's general
duty to provide a place of employment free from recognized hazards likely
to cause serious injury applies in situations in which no standard has been
promulgated." An unreasonable result would occur if an employer's obliga-
tion within the areas he controls is lessened merely because of the issuance
of a standard." In order to avoid such a decrease in an employer's responsi-
bility, the general duty to provide safe conditions throughout a worksite
must be applied to violations of the specific duty clause in situations
involving the possibility of serious harm." Serious violations of the Act,
therefore, should be treated alike whether they fall under the specific or
general duty clause. Since the employer's general duty does not cover non-
serious injuries,9 ' the "place of employment" language of the general duty
clause cannot be used to expand an employer's specific duty, making him
responsible for correcting non-serious violations of standards outside his
area of control.2 Thus an employer should not be held to have violated the
Act when his employees have access to non-serious hazards in areas in
which he has no authority to correct conditions.
The Seventh Circuit supported its analysis by discussing the policy
considerations behind the Anning-Johnson I holding. The court first as-
serted that making more than one employer responsible for abating partic-
ular non-serious hazards may cause confusion among the firms at a project
concerning who is responsible for compliance with the safety standard."
was minimal. Id. The court further noted that at construction projects the removal of one
subcontractor could halt the entire project. Id.
11 Id. at 1090.
97 Id.
0 See Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., OSHD (CCH) 16,725, at 21,474 (OSHRC
1973).
11 Congress enacted the general duty clause primarily because it realized specific stan-
dards could not cover every conceivable situation. Note, OSHA: Employer Beware, 10 Hous.
L. REv. 426, 431 (1972).
o In support of its holding that employers are not responsible for non-serious violations
by other firms the Seventh Circuit stated that the purpose of the Act was not to punish, but
to achieve compliance with safety standards and the abatement of hazards. 516 F.2d at 1088.
The court implied that holding employers in violation of the Act for hazards created by other
firms and not likely to cause serious injury would be in the nature of a penalty. Id. The court
does not, however, state why this position results in a "penalty" for non-serious violations
but not for serious violations.
" See Discussion of Anning-Johnson, supra note 3, at 790.
92 See 516 F.2d at 1088.
,3 Id. at 1089.
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This confusion, the court maintained, could lead to the failure of any firm
to assume responsibility for correcting the condition. 4 The result antici-
pated by the court, however, is no more likely to occur than the situation
anticipated by the Secretary which is that the more firms responsible for
alleviating a danger, the more likely the hazard will be corrected. Further-
more, if the court were correct in its "confusion" assumption, the same
reasoning would apply to recognized hazards included under the general
duty clause. The language of the general duty clause indicates, however,
that Congress believed the purposes of the Act would be best achieved by
citing each employer whose workers had access to a single hazard. 5 There-
fore, the Seventh Circuit's view that citing more than one employer for
non-serious violations would hinder abatement is not in accord with the
rationale of the general duty clause..
The Seventh Circuit's policy argument also emphasizes that undesira-
ble economic difficulties might result from placing responsibility for non-
serious violations on more than one employer. 6 Foremost among these
difficulties is that a noncontrolling employer may be forced to quit the
worksite in order to avoid violating the Act." The court also indicated that
conflicts might arise among employers concerning who should pay for
abatement of dangers,9" and that wasteful multiple expenditures may
occur if many employers attempt to correct a single violation.99 The court
felt that the distinction between serious and non-serious violations of the
Act allowed for judicial consideration of economic consequences.' 9 The
court reasoned that the interrelationship between the minor injuries
" Id.
" Under the Anning-Johnson decision mere exposure of a worker to a recognized hazard,
not covered by a standard and likely to cause serious injury, is a violation of the general duty
clause. Id. at 1086. Since more than one firm's employees can have access to such a hazard,
more than one employer can be cited. See Morey, supra note 3, at 988.
" 516 F.2d at 1089-90.
" Id.; accord, Morey, supra note 3, at 998. If an employer is found responsible for hazards
in areas he does not control, there may be circumstances in which he is unable to abate the
hazard. Union craft rules often require only certain employees to do the work necessary to
abate a hazard, see 516 F.2d at 1089, and the employer may lack the funds needed to hire
the designated workers. For example, union carpenters may be required to put up guard rails
along an open floor. Certain firms, however, such as a plumbing company, do not normally
employ union carpenters and usually are without the capital for hiring them. See id. Such
employers, whose men may need to cross the unguarded floors on the way to their worksite,
might be forced to remove their workers from the project in order to comply with the Act.
See id.
The court did not consider other deleterious economic consequences that might result
from holding employers responsible for violations by other firms. See Discussion of Anning-
Johnson, supra note 3, at 797 n.64. The most important of the consequences are that the
subcontractor will probably not be reimbursed by the general contractor for any additional
cost resulting from the negligence of other firms at the worksite, and the subcontractors'
insurance may not cover injuries to employees performing safety repairs. Id.
11 516 F.2d at 1089.
" Id.
'® Id. at 1088.
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usually associated with non-serious violations and the deleterious eco-
nomic effects resulting from multiple responsibility for violations required
limiting culpability to the employer who created or controlled the non-
serious hazard. 0'
The Anning-Johnson I court's consideration of the economic effects on
business is directed by section 6(b) of the Act, which requires the Secretary
to consider feasibility in promulgating standards. 2 "Feasibility" includes
appropriate consideration of economic as well as technological factors., 3
The term "feasibility" was added to section 6(b) to prevent courts from
interpreting the Act to require absolute safety regardless of practicality. 4
Since Congress intended economic realities to be considered in the imple-
mentation of the Act,0 5 the Seventh Circuit was warranted in considering
potential financial harm to employers as an element in its decision.,0
Neither the Secretary of Labor nor the OSHRC, however, has accepted
the Anning-Johnson I opinion. The Secretary has proposed guidelines that
reject the Seventh Circuit's emphasis on the degree of employee endanger-
ment as a criterion in issuing citations. 07 Under the Secretary's proposal
a firm will be cited whenever its employees are exposed to "readily appar-
ent" hazards. 00 If the OSHA area director finds that the danger is not
10, Id. at 1090.
"0 29 U.S.C. § 655(B)(5) (1970).
" See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
,0 S. REP. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 58 (1970).
10 Other courts have looked to congressional intent to determine whether economic
criteria should be weighed in implementing legislation. See, e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. EPA,
427 U.S. 246 (1976) (economic feasibility not a factor in consideration of state implementation
plan); North Carolina Utilities Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1055 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 321 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977) (No. 76-1675) (FCC cannot properly adopt
technical requirements without considering economic impact); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm'n Inc., v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (balancing of economic considera-
tons and statutory purpose required by National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332 (1970)).
10 On appeal of Anning-Johnson I, the Secretary of Labor and the OSHRC maintained
that the Act required citing employers whose own workers were exposed to non-serious haz-
ards created by other firms. See Anning-Johnson Co. v. OSHRC, 516 F.2d 1081, 1089 (7th
Cir. 1975). Since both bodies within the administrative agency implementing the Act were
in agreement, their interpretation was entitled to deference. Cf. Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933) (deference given to tariff commission's interpretation
of hearing requirements). The Supreme Court emphasized that deference is particularly due
when the administrative practice at issue is new or untried. See Power Reactor Co. v. Electri-
cians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961); Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S.
143, 153-54 (1946). Therefore, the Seventh Circuit was bound to uphold the administrative
agency's construction of the Act unless the interpretation was unreasonable. See Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965). Although the Seventh Circuit's opinion is supported by eco-
nomic consideration, the ruling fails to prove the administrative agency's position unreasona-
ble. See OSHA - On Multi-employer Worksites, supra note 13, at 799. For a discussion of
the problems arising when the OSHRC and the Secretary disagree on an interpretation of
the Act, see note 13 supra.




"readily apparent," a citation will be issued only if the employer of the
endangered worker created the hazard or had the ability to alleviate the
condition. 9 If the guidelines are enacted, an employer will be considered
able to abate a not readily apparent hazard if he has the workers, materi-
als, and equipment necessary to correct the condition, or the contractual
authority to order the creating firm to rectify the situation.10
The Secretary's proposed guidelines do not distinguish between serious
and non-serious violations of the Act."' Consequently, an employer may
escape liability even when his employees are in danger of serious injury if
he neither created nor has authority to correct the hazardous condition.
This result is contrary to the language of the general duty clause that an
employer has violated the act whenever his employees have access to haz-
ards likely to cause serious harm."2 Furthermore, citing employers whose
workers are exposed to readily apparent hazards might result in the eco-
nomic dislocations envisioned by the court in Anning-Johnson LI Since
the ability-to-abate exception would not apply to either serious or non-
serious readily apparent violations, an employer without the means to
correct such a condition would be forced to remove his workers from the
project in order to avoid being cited. Therefore, work stoppages could
result even when minimal employee harm is involved. The Secretary's
proposal, if enacted, could result in an application of the Act contrary to
Congress's emphasis on preventing serious injury and its intent to avoid
unreasonable economic hardship on employers.
Two particularly important OSHRC cases, Anning-Johnson Co.
(Anning-Johnson II)'" and Grossman Steel & Aluminum Corp.,' 5 deal
with the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Anning-Johnson L In these two cases
the OSHRC expounded a rule which is designated as the Anning-
Johnson/Grossman rule."' This rule requires the citing of an employer at
I" d.
,,0 Id. The construction industry responded critically to the proposed guidelines. [1976
Transfer Binder] EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 10,451. The industry maintained
that nothing in the Act or its legislative history showed congressional intent to make each
employer a general insurer for correctinghazards of other employers. Id. The economic factors
raised in Anning-Johnson I were also indicated as contrary to the proposal. Id.
' 41 Fed. Reg. 17,639 (1976).
"" See Anning-Johnson Co. v. OSHRC, 516 F.2d 1081, 1089 (7th Cir. 1975).
"' Id.
,, OSHD (CCH) 20,690, at 24,779 (OSHRC 1976).
"'OSHD (CCH) 20,691, at 24,788 (OSHRC 1976).
"' See 1 EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 510 (1976). The Anning-Johnson I
holding and the Anning-Johnson/Grossman rule arose in factual circumstances that limit
their appication to the construction industry. In Central of Ga. R.R., OSHD (CCH) 21,688,
at 26,033 (OSHRC 1977), the OSHRC refused to extend the Anning-JohnsonGrossman rule
to cases not involving construction worksites. The OSHRC held that only the general rule
that an employer violates the Act when his employees are exposed to any hazard would apply
to non-construction sites. Id. This position accords with the Seventh Circuit's emphasis on
the construction industry practice of limiting employer control to specific workplaces at a
project. Anning-Johnson Co. v. OSHRC, 516 F.2d 1081, 1090 (7th Cir. 1975). The Secretary
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a multi-firm worksite whenever his employees have access to a hazard."7
The OSHA area director must issue a citation regardless of whether the
cited employer controlled the hazard, or of the severity of the likely injury
to his employees."' Unlike prior OSHRC decisions, however, the employer
is given two affirmative defenses when cited for a violation of the Act."'
First, the employer may escape liability by showing that his employees
were protected by reasonable alternative measures although the workers
had access to an area not in compliance with safety standards.'20 Second,
the OSHRC will vacate a citation if the employer can prove he did not have
actual notice of a dangerous condition and should not be held to have had
constructive knowledge.'2 ' Before these defenses can be asserted, however,
the employer must demonstrate that he neither created nor controlled the
hazard to such a degree that he could have corrected the condition in the
manner contemplated under the Act.'22 .
Like the Secretary's proposed guidelines, the Anning-
Johnson/Grossman Rule does not distinguish between serious and non-
serious violations of safety standards. An employer can avoid liability for
serious violations by proof of either affirmative defense. As stressed in
Anning-Johnson I, a serious violation of a regulation is defined as a hazard
"likely to cause death or serious injury," the phrase used to define the
employer's general duty to provide a safe workplace.'1 The general duty
clause, however, is explicit in its requirement that employers provide a
place of employment free from recognized hazards likely to cause serious
harm. 24 The language of the general duty clause thus bars the availability
of affirmative defenses to general duty breaches.'1 Yet, serious violations
of Labor's proposed guidelines are not limited to construction sites, but such a limitation
seems to be implied from the Secretary's reliance on Anning-Johnson L See 41 Fed. Reg.
17,639 (1976).
"' Anning-Johnson Co. OSHD (CCH) 20,690, at 24,783 (OSHRC 1976).
"1 Id.
'" OSHD (CCH) 20,690, at 24,783; see, e.g., Otis Elevator Co., OSHD (CCH) 20,693,
at 24,799 (OSHRC 1976); Grossman Steel & Aluminum Co., OSHD (CCH) 20,691, at 24,791
(OSHRC 1976).
' Anning-Johnson Co., OSHD (CCH) 20,690, at 24,783 (OSHRC 1976). The OSHRC
noted that while no distinction was made between "serious" and "non-serious" violations in
applying its theory of liability, the OSHRC would consider the gravity of the hazard in
determining what alternative measures qualify as "realistic". Id. at 24,783 n.16 (OSHRC
1976).
"I1 The cited firm is deemed to have constructive knowledge that a condition is hazardous
if a reasonable person with the actual knowledge of the employer would have realized the
danger involved. Anning-Johnson Co., OSHD (CCH) T 20,690, at 24,783 n.16 (OSHRC 1976);
see McLean Trucking Co. v. OSHRC, 503 F.2d 8, 11 (4th Cir. 1974); Ryder Truck Lines, Inc.
v. Brennan, 497 F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 1974).
'" Grossman Steel & Aluminum Corp., OSHD (CCH) 20,691, at 24,791 (OSHRC 1976);
Anning-Johnson Co., OSHD (CCH) 20,690, at 24,783 (OSHRC 1976). The propriety of
placing the burden of proving non-control on the employer is open to constitutional challenge.
For a discussion of this issue see note 67 supra.





of standards necessarily must be treated the same as violations of the
general duty clause.' 8 Therefore, the OSHRC's position, allowing affirma-
tive defenses to serious violations, is contrary to the plain meaning of the
general duty clause.
In addition to the lack of support for the Anning-Johnson/Grossman
rule in the Act itself, the rule fails to provide employers with a reliable
standard by which to gage their actions.'2 Although the OSHRC holds that
realistic alternatives to strict compliance is a defense, '2 it fails to define
clearly what type of protective measures qualify.'9 The Anning-Johnson II
opinion apparently holds that providing effective protective equipment
qualifies as an acceptable protective measure,' 0 while the Grossman opin-
ion allows such additional alternatives as requesting the general contractor
to correct the hazard, and instructing employees to avoid dangerous
areas.'3 ' Furthermore, one subsequent case indicates the OSHRC will find
the daily inspecting of the worksite to discover hazardous conditions, the
informing of employees of dangers at weekly safety meetings, and the
scheduling of work in the safest possible areas to be realistic additional
safety measures.'
32
In order to allow employers to evaluate the reasonable cost of protecting
workers and to avoid wasteful litigation expenses by firms who have at-
tempted to comply with the Anning-Johnson/Grossman rule,'1 the
OSHRC should develop a specific standard as to what is expected of em-
ployers at multi-firm worksites. Since the purpose of the Act was not to
punish employees, the OSHRC should accept all good faith efforts at pro-
tecting employees from non-serious violatons. When serious violations are
involved the congressional intent of minimizing workplace fatalities dic-
tates that effective protective equipment must be supplied in order to
6" For comparison between serious violations of standards and violations of the general
duty clause, see note 19 supra.
6" Anning-Johnson Co., OSHD (CCH) 20,690, at 24,786 (OSHRC 1976) (Moran,
Comm'r, concurring in part dissenting in part).
,2 Anning-Johnson Co., OSHD (CCH) 20,690, at 24,783 (OSHRC 1976).
'11 Id. at 24,786 (Moran, Comm'r, concurring in part dissenting in part); see Grossman
Steel & Aluminum Corp., OSHD (CCH) 1 20,691, at 24,794 (OSHRC 1976) (Moran, Comm'r,
dissenting).
' Anning-Johnson Co., OSHD (CCH) 20,690, at 24,783 (OSHRC 1976); see Data
Electric Co., OSHD (CCH) 21,593, at 25,916 (OSHRC 1977) (Barnako, Comm'r, concur-
ring).
136 Anning-Johnson Co., OSHD (CCH) 1 20,690, at 24,786 (OSHRC 1976) (Moran,
Comm'r, concurring in part dissenting in part).
"I2 Otis Elevator Co., OSHD (CCH) 20,693, at 24,798 (OSHRC 1976); see Truland-
Elliot, OSHD (CCH) 1 22,116, at 22,648 (OSHRC 1977), aff'g 21,742, at 26,119 (ALJ 1977);
Dear Constr. Co., OSHD (CCH) 21,792, at 26,205 (OSHRC 1977); A. Prokosch & Sons Sheet
Metal, Inc., OSHD (CCH) 21,670, at 26,017 (ALJ 1977); Jess Howard Electric Co., OSHD
(CCH) 21,624, at 25,970 (ALJ 1976).
' See, e.g., Western Waterproofing Co., OSHD (CCH) 1 21,869, at 26,365 (OSHRC
1977); Paramount Plumbing & Heating Co., OSHD (CCH) T 21,820, at 26,269 (OSHRC
1977); A. Pearlman Iron Works, Inc., OSHD (CCH) % 21,939, at 26,440 (AL_ 1977); Colfry
Bros. Terrazzo Contractors, Inc., OSHD (CCH) $ 21,647, at 25,994 (ALJ 1977).
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comply with the Act.'34
To work effectively, the Act must be enforced realistically with due
"I See H.R. REP. No. 91-1291 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 24 (1970) LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ACT OF 1970, at 853 (Comm. Print 1971).
Although the controversy involving citations at multi-employer worksites has primarily
concerned the relationship between subcontractors and the Act, another major issue is
whether the general contractor should be responsible for violations by the subcontractors at
the project. The position originally taken by the Secretary of Labor was that the general
contractor violated the Act when employees of his subcontractors were exposed to hazards.
See Gilles & Cotting, Inc., OSHD (CCH) 16,763, at 21,512 (OSHRC 1973). The basis for
this view is that the general contractor is in the best position to supervise overall project safety
and therefore should be held responsible when proper conditions are not maintained. See
Gilles & Cotting, Inc., OSHD (CCH) 15,140, at 20,216 (ALJ 1972). The OSHRC, however,
rejected this view in Gilles & Cotting, Inc., OSHD (CCH) 16,763, at 21,512 (OSHRC 1973)
aff'd, 504 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1974).
In Gilles & Cotting, the OSHRC held that a general contractor could not be cited for
violations unless he maintained a contractual relationship with the endangered employee.
OSHD (CCH) 16,763, at 21,512 (OSHRC 1973). This result is supported by a definitional
analysis of the Act. An "employee" is defined in terms of a singular relationship between the
employee and his employer. For a discussion of the term "employee" as used in the Act see
note 7 supra. The OSHRC reasoned, therefore, that since an employment relationship does
not generally exist between a general contractor and a subcontractor's workers, the OSHRC
could not find the general contractor in violation of the Act unless his own employees had
access to a hazard. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., OSHD (CCH) 16,763, at 21,512 (OSHRC 1973).
In Grossman Steel, OSHD (CCH) 20,691, at 24,788 (OSHRC 1976), the OSHRC re-
versed its position that the general contractor could not be held responsible when a subcon-
tractor's employees had access to a hazard. The OSHRC held that a general contractor is
responsible for violations by his subcontractors which he could reasonably be expected to have
prevented or abated in his supervisory capacity. Id. at 24,791. Thus, whether the general
contractor will be in violation of the Act depends on what can be reasonably expected of such
employers.
Although the Grossman opinion fails to provide standards for determining what should
be reasonably required of the general contractor, OSHRC decisions subsequent to Grossman
indicate that he is not obligated to scrutinize every phase of the project. See National Oil
Recovery Corp., OSHD (CCH) 21,460, at 25,739 (ALJ 1976). The general contractor is,
however, responsible for those hazards which are apparent from a reasonable inspection of
the project. See Knutson Constr. Co., OSHD (CCH) 21,185, at 25,479 (OSHRC 1976);
Austin Co., OSHD (CCH) 22,150, at 26,673 (ALJ 1977). The OSHRC position is supported
by congressional intent that the Act be enforced in a practical manner. See AFL-CIO v.
Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 1020-21 (3rd Cir. 1975).
Support for the OSHRC's position can also be drawn from common law. At common law
a general contractor in control of the structure or premises where the work is being done is
liable to subcontractors' employees who, in the course of their duties, are injured by the
failure of the general contractor to provide a safe work environment. See Southern Mineral
Co. v. Barrett, 281 Ala. 76, 199 So. 2d 87 (1967); Grant v. Joseph J. Duffy Co., 20 Ill. App.
3d 669, 314 N.E.2d 478 (1974); Butler v. King, 99 N.H. 150, 106 A.2d 385 (1954). Employees
of subcontractors under common law are business invitees of the general contractor, see
Delgado v. W.C. Garcia & Assoc., 212 Cal. App. 2d 5, 27 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1963); Hooey v.
Airport Constr. Co., 253 N.Y. 486, 171 N.E. 752 (1930), and are therefore entitled to a
workplace free from all dangers which the general contractor might have discovered by rea-
sonable inspection. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 386. Since the Act was designed to correct
conditions before injuries occur, the general contractor should be responsible for hazardous
conditions discoverable by such a reasonable inspection of the project. The Secretary's pro-
posed guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,639 (1976), accords with the Grossman opinion as they allow
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regard given both to the desire to provide labor with safe places of employ-
ment and the economic displacement resulting from too stringent require-
ments on business.'3 5 When dealing with serious violations of the Act, an
employer's relevant workplace should be the entire project. Any employer
whose employees have access to a danger likely to cause serious injury
existing anywhere on the project should be cited regardless whether the
firm created or controlled the hazard. Defining the "place of employ-
ment" in this manner accords with the OSHRC's Annington-Johnsonl
Grossman rule.' When concerned with non-serious violations of the Act,
the relevant workplace should be the area under each employer's control.
An employer should not be in violation of the Act if his employees had
access to dangers not likely to cause serious injury that were neither
created nor controlled by the firm. This definition of the "place of employ-
ment" is supported by the Seventh Circuit'sholding in Anning-Johnson
LIY" As developed by the Second Circuit in Underhill,'38 however, creating
and controlling firms should be culpable for both serious and non-serious
violations occurring throughout the worksite as the duty to neither create
nor control a hazard runs to all employees at the worksite and not just
workers in a contractual relationship with the responsible firm.
By broadly defining the class of employees to which the creating and
controlling firms owe a duty, and by defining the relevant workplace as the
entire project for serious violations, courts can achieve Congress's goal of
substantial employee protection from major injury. However, by limiting
responsibility of employers for non-serious violations to the areas they
control, wasteful expenditures and possible work stoppages could be
avoided when only minimal employee injury is involved. This approach
provides a realistic allocation of costs and benefits in applying the Act to
multi-employer worksites.
GARY S. MARx
for the citing of the general contractor when a subcontractor's employee is exposed to-a
hazard.
I Compare Clarkson Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 531 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1976) with Anning-
Johnson Co. v. OSHRC, 516 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1975).
lu See Anning-Johnson Co., OSHD (CCH) 20,690, at 24,786 (OSHRC 1976); Grossman
Steel & Aluminum Corp., OSHD (CCH) 20,691, at 24,791 (OSHRC 1976).
See Anning-Johnson Co. v. OSHRC, 516 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1975).
l See Brennan v. OSHRC (Underhill), 513 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1975).
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